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This article surveys the internationalization of China’s leading digital 
communication and entertainment companies, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, 
and their strategic acquisitions, both domestic and international. The 
article shows that with regard to audiences and users of their platforms, the 
most likely “take-off” points outside the Mainland are within Asia. Future 
prospects for expansion include the One Belt One Road region (the old Silk 
Road including central Asia), where state-owned enterprises are currently 
laying out infrastructure. Acquisitions serve a dual purpose: they establish 
beachheads for expansion overseas, and they allow foreign media to “send” 
their content to China. The article notes three levels of “going out”: cultural 
products and services, ideology, and organizations. The article compares the 
official state cultural media apparatus to the maritime hero Zheng He in the 
early Ming dynasty, who took a message of cultural supremacy from the center 
(i.e. the Middle Kingdom) to the peripheral regions. However, the new media 
companies and their platforms are not representing the government; they are 
consolidating their operations and aggregating audiences. The article asks, 
“Whose interests are ultimately being served?”
Keywords: Digital Media, BAT, Online Platforms, Chinese Media Going Out, Soft 
Power, Cultural Power
Introduction: Culture Goes Digital
How far, and where, does Chinese culture travel? Such questions have exercised the 
minds of Chinese politicians, national policy advisors, scholars, and many Chinese nationals— 
ever since 2007’s Seventeenth National Party Congress (NPC) when President Hu Jintao 
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advocated strengthening the nation’s soft power,3 urging domestic cultural industries to “go 
out.”4 Hu’s cultural advocacy followed the international successes of key state-owned enter-
prises known as “national champions.” By the mid-2000s, “going out” had become a clarion 
call, a national policy imperative, in effect a change in focus. During the previous decade, 
internationalization was deemed less important than encouraging foreign companies to 
“come in.”5 As Yu Hong has shown, the welcome mat was extended in the 1990s to transna-
tional capital in a number of export processing zones6: for instance, approved foreign com-
panies were granted significant tax concessions on top of access to cheap labor.
Almost two decades have passed since World Trade Organization (WTO) accession and a 
decade since the Seventeenth NPC that saw the announcement of China’s soft power. As we 
discuss below, this announcement had a political legacy that predated Deng Xiaoping’s devel-
opment mantra “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in 1992. The Eighteenth Congress, 
two decades later, saw the transition to a new leadership style, one reminiscent of both Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, and the voicing of an alternative slogan—“cultural empower-
ment.”7 The Nineteenth Congress in October 2017 provides a barometer of how this latter 
concept has developed and become embedded in the quest for the “great rejuvenation” of 
the Chinese nation.8 Unsurprisingly, the issue of challenging the might of foreign media 
industries remains as topical as ever before. The key question that activates China’s media 
sector is, “How might we (i.e., in China) learn to be more internationally competitive?”
The intention of the article is to show the extent of internationalization among China’s lead-
ing digital communication enterprises and how the scope of their ventures provides a foun-
dation for Chinese culture and media products to reach new markets, in doing so contributing 
to the “great rejuvenation.” The article shows that “going out” embodies at least three levels. 
The first refers to the going out of China’s products (i.e., media products and services); the 
second level is transmitting ideology; and the third level is Chinese organizations, people, 
and delegations (investment, study, travel). For the government, the second of these objec-
tives—ideology—is the most important. For the digital companies, the goals are mostly eco-
nomic; their strategy is not map-oriented nor is it ideologically determined; they follow their 
economic trajectories which allows them to go faster and longer, although this has conse-
quences if they move faster than the government’s expectations. Like the massive ships of 
Admiral Zheng He, the Ming dynasty navigator, the government finds it hard to change its 
course. Whereas the government ultimately works in Five-Year Plans, the strategy of the 
digital enterprises is more flexible.
The article shows how and why the digital economy is taking Chinese culture further than 
ever before. The research framework is informed by “platformization,” which in relation to 
China’s emerging digital behemoths refers to their capability “to reformat the web according 
to the logic of social media”9: in other words, digital platforms are changing the way that 
cultural content is produced, distributed, shared, and consumed. We support our analysis 
with academic studies of China’s media internationalization and soft power campaigns, 
together with press accounts and industry data. We begin our journey, however, with the 
genesis of the concept of soft power in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The following 
section describes the ascendency of three dominant internet companies, known colloquially 
as the “three kingdoms” or BAT: Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent. Preceding this, we look briefly 
at Wanda, a dominant private company based in the northeast city of Dalian that has 
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responded to the government’s call to take Chinese culture to the world and encountered 
some unexpected political turbulence.
The final section investigates how acquisitions and territorial expansion have entered into the 
“going out” equation. On the new western frontier, the BAT are competing for assets in Hollywood 
and other European centers. Deals are being made with leading international media companies; 
the quid pro quo in many cases is international access to the Chinese market. The eastern fron-
tier encompasses the Asia-Pacific region and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) territories that 
were previously conduits for Chinese ideas during the Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties.10 The 
OBOR brings land-based territories into the equation, from Xinjiang through the old Silk Road 
corridors to central Asia and beyond, as well as sea-facing territories in the Straits of Malacca 
such as Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia. While the government’s current inten-
tion is to build infrastructure into these regions and thereby channel Chinese state-owned 
businesses to the region, a secondary purpose is to disseminate Chinese culture.
Having overseas digital platforms—both government-owned and privately owned—in place 
is a major advance over the past decade. The concluding section reexamines the question of 
competing interests. How far can the private companies reach while balancing the objectives 
of “serving the nation” and serving corporate shareholders?
Dreamscapes: Past and Present
The term “soft power” has appeared in many depictions of China’s political development 
over the past decade11; as we will show, it now has a direct relationship to the regional expan-
sion of China’s media industries.12 Most scholarly papers recognize the genesis of the con-
cept, citing Joseph Nye Jr., the American political scientist who coined the term in 1990.13 
Nye said that the soft power of a country rests on three resources: a country’s culture, its 
political values, and its foreign policies. Although the initial take-up of the term within China 
can be attributed to the translation of Nye’s Bound to Lead in 1992, the sinisation of soft 
power embodies several traditional elements from the Warring States Period, notably 
Mencius’s moral concept of the “kingly way”14 and the military strategist Sun Zi’s guides to 
subjugating the enemy without a fight. Wang and Lu contend that the Chinese conceptual-
ization of soft power is much broader than the usage attributed to Nye in that it can refer to 
nations and organizations, as well as individuals.15 Such a particularistic approach enables 
the state to nominate cultural organizations and individuals that exemplify Chinese culture.
While certainly activated by Nye’s intervention, the adoption of the term soft power in the 
PRC has an earlier legacy. In 1988, Zheng Bijian, a leading consultant in the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (CASS), wrote that “Cultural strength is also a national capability and an 
extremely important component part of the “comprehensive national strength.”16 the latter 
term referring to an amalgam of “strengths” including economic, political, and cultural. 
Athough the so-called Comprehensive National Strength debate died down due to fears that 
it was uncharacteristically bellicose, the concept of “cultural security” arose,17 advocating 
greater state resources for cultural and media sectors to challenge westernization and cul-
tural globalization. Informed by cultural security concerns, soft power surfaced in internal 
study sessions that involved senior Party-affiliated intellectuals.18 President Hu Jintao attended 
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several of these sessions. Hu was reportedly interested in how the use of the internet, referred 
to in internal documents as “China’s network culture,” might facilitate China’s soft power.
As this article shows, the rise of China’s digital communications industries in recent years 
has generated a hard edge to soft power, which under the Xi Jinping regime is designated as 
“cultural empowerment.” The question of empowerment resonates deeply among intellec-
tual circles in China. The yearning for cultural rejuvenation and “cultural self-confidence” is 
a key element of the “Chinese Dream” proposed by Xi in 2013.19 Despite the Chinese govern-
ment’s attempts to hose down its global ambitions in the light of territorial expansion (see 
below), the Chinese dreamscape can be encapsulated in the idea When China Rules the World, 
the title of a book by the British Marxist, Martin Jacques. Unsurprisingly, this has been a 
bestseller in China, and Jacques is a honored guest on China’s state media.20
Digital Champions
The term “national champions” is often deployed by political scientists and economists when 
describing the internationalization of Chinese companies, particularly large state-owned 
enterprises. Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government attempted to build “a team of 
globally competitive firms.”21 The “going global strategy,” introduced in 2001,22 has been pri-
marily directed at national champions. The latter term, however, is rarely used in relation to 
China’s state-owned media companies such as China Central Television. We will argue that 
the internationalization of privately run digital media companies evokes the description 
“digital champions.” These companies have an allegiance to shareholders, as well as a respon-
sibility to the state, which might be described as a “stakeholder.”
In the early 2000s, Chinese journalists drew attention to the “cultural trade deficit”23 to describe 
the nation’s weak export earnings in cultural services. One external force was Hollywood 
and the ever-present threat of Western liberal ideology; the second force was the Korean 
Wave, the name given to the remarkable surge of South Korean film, television, and games 
industries in the late 1990s and early 2000s.24 While less of an ideological threat than Hollywood, 
the Korean Wave had the effect of opening the floodgates of the kind of cool East Asian pop 
culture that many Chinese scholars deemed less authentic than China’s own traditional culture.
How would the nation combat these dual forces? The response was the marshaling of gov-
ernment resources to the cause of China’s culture “going out.” The formulation of a raft of 
policies from 2002 to 200525 was followed by Chinese companies seeking out offshore invest-
ment opportunities and claiming to be doing what the government had mandated. The 
Cultural Industry Rejuvenation Plan, legislated in 2009, saw an increase in China’s foreign 
investment in culture, sports, and entertainment—from RMB 19.76 million in 2009 to RMB 
196.34 million in 2012.26 Although these figures are relatively small in comparison with 
Hollywood, they do indicate an upward trajectory.
The unprecedented growth of the internet since the mid-2000s has changed the mode 
of going out: it allows Chinese media products to reach foreign audiences more effectively. 
At the same time, online media provide new ways for foreign media content to come 
into China—often circumventing firewalls thanks to virtual private networks (VPNs).27 As 
the Chinese language internet has grown, more people around the world have become 
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connected to its platforms. In 2008, English accounted for 427 million internet users. Chinese 
was then 233 million.28 By 2017, however, the comparisons were strikingly different, with 
Chinese accounting for 771 million users (compared to English 985 million); moreover, with 
Chinese being the most spoken language in the world, this leaves considerable room for 
growth.29 Digital literacy and globalization, combined with access to online worlds, is provid-
ing new platforms for Chinese ideas.
Does online activity contribute to the government’s “going out” campaign? This remains a 
point of contention. Reports of “massive” online distribution of Chinese TV drama lack evi-
dence of the nationality of consumers. It is problematic to conflate online “hits” with global 
success: many such hits are recurrent visits, and the users are invariably native Chinese 
speakers.30 This does not equate with “impact” among non-Chinese-speaking audiences. 
This problem is endemic to propaganda emanating from Beijing, noted in a recent chapter by 
the UK scholar Daya Thussu, in which the circulation of China Daily worldwide (based on 
government data) is reported as six hundred thousand with a massive forty-five million read-
ers31; elsewhere in the same edited collection, Falk Hartig reflects on the widespread dis-
crepancy of official circulation figures of China Daily, which range from two hundred 
thousand to four hundred thousand and even as high as nine hundred thousand.32
Evidently, a great deal of consumption now takes place on online platforms; in the future, 
consumption is more likely to be aggregated and understood demographically by big data. 
If the term “national champions” depicts China’s powerful state-owned enterprises, for 
instance, China Mobile and Sinopec, “digital champions” can be best typified by BAT.33 BAT 
are akin to digital capitalists, to draw on Yu Hong’s depiction of the evolving corporate 
nature of communication technology sector in China—a state-led model that “contends, 
collaborates, and overlaps with the US-dominated system of global digital capitalism.”34 As 
Jia and Winseck point out, the political economy of BAT is underscored by links to Silicon 
Valley investors.35 In an earlier writing, Yuezhi Zhao used the description “between the 
party line and the bottom line” to characterize the nature of collaboration between govern-
ment, communications companies in China, and transnational corporate interests.36 
“Contending” enhances the status of these companies as national champions; “collaborat-
ing,” on the contrary, entails navigating a delicate course between being too close to Western 
capitalists and too close to the Chinese propaganda machine.
Before addressing the question of how BAT connect to audiences and enhance China’s cul-
ture “going out,” it is worth reflecting on their core businesses. Baidu (B), with headquarters 
in Beijing, is fundamentally a search engine, sometimes called China’s Google. It has a range 
of additional interests, including artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous vehicles, app devel-
opment, online video, music, and cloud computing. Alibaba (A), a Hangzhou-based company, 
is an e-commerce colossus with massive investment in electronic payment systems, block 
chain technology, AI, and cloud computing, as well as significant investment in digital media 
and entertainment. Tencent (T), headquartered in the southern city of Shenzhen, is the 
world’s largest instant communications empire. It has interests in media entertainment, 
mobile games, smartphones, and electronic payment systems.
Unsurprisingly, the industry leaders of BAT have validated their companies’ ambitions in 
line with China’s “going out.” Their success has been aided by a combination of industry 
protectionism and national security provisions, which has restricted or retarded the entry of 
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powerful foreign forces like Google, YouTube, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook while providing 
incentives for Chinese companies to recruit talent from overseas. BAT have the capacity to 
dominate the domestic market while reaching beyond China’s borders, utilizing a unique 
Chinese mode of “platform capitalism.” The term platform, as used by Nick Srnicek, refers to the 
emergence of a business model, “capable of extracting and controlling immense amounts of 
data.”37 In this understanding, platforms transcend internet companies or tech companies—they 
operate wherever digital interaction takes place. Many well-known social media sites are now 
conceptualized as “platforms.” The platform metaphor is evident in the idea of convergence—
from a media industry legacy to embodiment in the computing industry, a process which is 
reformatting the web and allowing “users” greater freedom to select how they consume.38
The business models of platform capitalists are different from the traditional vertically or hori-
zontally integrated communications conglomerates that have featured heavily in political econ-
omy of the media. Knowing what people are doing, watching, and sharing online would seem to 
provide an advantage in the content industries, especially when one owns the most popular 
online distribution channels. In fact, the digital economy, recognized in the state’s 2015 Internet 
Plus blueprint,39 holds the key to further prosperity in China according to the Party propaganda 
machine. Platformization—the combination of data storage in the cloud, streaming services, 
and the Internet of Things and the linking of social media applications with the affordances of 
the sharing economy—will assist China’s businesses to compete and internationalize.
The intervention of these companies into sectors previously monopolized by traditional 
media underlines the key argument of this article—they are obliged to service the call of 
government as much as their shareholders, or to put it another way, government wants to 
be a shareholder in the BAT.40 These emergent Chinese digital champions, along with Wanda, 
the ostensibly real estate company that sidelines in film production and film studio procure-
ment, constitute a different modality of technological upgrading than the previous decades 
(1990s and 2000s) when the focus was squarely on the development of technology networks, 
telecoms, and software industries.41
In some ways, Dalian Wanda is the odd man out; its core business is real estate, not media; 
however, the company has aspirations to become a player, leveraging on its accumulated 
assets in the entertainment industries. CEO Wang Jianlin became enamored with the pros-
pects of the media and cultural sector, in part because it offered an alternative different 
business model to real estate, plus it had the added bonus of responding to the government’s 
call for cultural empowerment. In his book The Wanda Way, Wang writes,
The Wanda Group is the first private investor in China to invest in the cultural industry, and the 
largest investor in cultural businesses among all Chinese companies. In August last year, I reported 
to the leaders of the central government on Wanda’s cultural business development, and our 
achievements were regarded positively by the leaders.42
In a speech made in February 2012 at the Wanda Institute, Wang pointed to his ambitions to 
develop Wanda into a “global brand.”43
Cultural investments include Wanda’s acquisition of the movie theater exhibition chains, 
such as AMC Theater Multiplex in North America (2012), Hoyts in Australia (2015), ODEON 
and UCI in Europe (2016), and the Carmike cinema chain in the United States (2016).44 Wanda’s 
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geographical diverse theatrical distribution of real estate augurs well for the international 
release of Chinese films, which has been a stumbling block for the industry, aside from 
screenings in film festivals. The company then bought Legendary Pictures, a major Hollywood 
company. Michael Curtin writes that
Wanda then made a $4 billion bid for a 49 percent stake in Paramount Pictures, hoping to angle its 
way into a major Hollywood studio that was then undergoing an internal power struggle. Coming 
away empty handed, Wanda nevertheless chalked up $28 billion in acquisitions and partnerships in 
2016 alone.45
In short, in answering the call to “go out,” Wanda had provided a pathway for others to fol-
low. The next wave saw the rise of the “three kingdoms.”
In the past few years, BAT have shown an interest in competing for the spoils of the cultural 
market, especially in the kind of content that appeals to younger urban demographics. The 
question of why these companies have chosen to compete for the spoils of the cultural sec-
tor where the party-state has a visible presence is multifaceted. Their entry is hardly sur-
prising, when one considers how and why their Western counterparts, Google, Amazon, 
Apple, and co., have targeted the content industries. While the western Silicon Valley enti-
ties, sometimes glossed as N-Cal (Northern California), have thrown out an industrial chal-
lenge to Hollywood (S-Cal), they have yet to demonstrate the kind of creative edge that has 
made S-Cal/Hollywood so successful.46
The domestic assets of BAT in the audiovisual sectors are best captured in three dominant 
online platforms: iQIYI, Youku Tudou, and Tencent Video. The first of the entities, iQIYI, is an 
online entertainment distribution platform. iQIYI is intent on forming a video business chain, 
in which everything appearing in the video will be available to purchase within one click. The 
pioneer in the online video sphere in China, Youku Tudou, combines professionally gener-
ated content (PGC), user-generated content (UGC), and self-made content. After its majority 
shareholding was acquired by the Alibaba group in 2012, Youku Tudou was able to set up 
China’s largest video search engine—Souku—while having China’s largest e-commerce com-
pany as its parent company.47 In 2018, Alibaba acquired 7.66 percent stake in the downsizing 
Wanda conglomerate, a move that strengthens Alibaba’s online cinema ticketing operation, 
Taopiaopiao.48 Tencent video is fast emerging as a contender thanks to the massive number 
of active WeChat users. With significant overseas collaborative partnerships, it is establish-
ing a super-media platform that will lead it to the top of the pyramid. As we describe below, 
the BAT and their subsidiary companies are extending their forces into peripheral regions.
Understanding the Territorial  
Outreach of China’s Platforms
The capacity of China’s digital platform to extend beyond the Chinese mainland is empowering 
“digital champions.” Hardly a week goes by without reading of some new venture in the trade 
presses. The question remains, “Does such capitalist activity constitute “going out” in the sense 
recognized by the party-state?” In this section, we delve deeper into their “cultural turn,” 
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keeping in mind the penchant for aggressive competitive behavior, which is more akin to bour-
geois capitalism than “socialism with Chinese characteristics”; however, the latter is defined. 
The chart below details the key strategic acquisitions by BAT within the Mainland since 2012, 
as well as noting outward bound activities that have a bearing on China’s media presence in the 
world and in the Asia-Pacific region. Of course, these emerging partnerships are increasing 
Chinese audiences’ access to global content, although it is important to emphasize that all 
content is now vetted directly by the Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party.
The investment in and partnerships with foreign film and television entities described in 
Table 1 reveal a strategic development imperative. The question raised in the introduction 
can now be addressed: How might Chinese media and communications companies learn to be 
more internationally competitive?
Producing content for world audiences involves narrative approaches that are different than 
those utilized within the PRC. This mode of international engagement entails a certain 
amount of risk. Overseas “partners” working in China regularly draw attention to the lack of 
narrative sophistication in mainland Chinese content, at least in relation to Hollywood.62 
Alternatively, buying up overseas assets fosters transfer of expertise and know-how; for 
instance, the acquisition of foreign studios brings legacy assets including brand awareness. 
The expansion of Chinese media companies in Hong Kong, in particular, has led to a migra-
tion of technical and creative expertise to the mainland.63
Coproduction provides another tentative step forward; in December 2016, Sony Pictures 
announced that it would coproduce a mandarin language adaptation of the successful US 
action-thriller television series Chosen (2013–14). The deal was struck with iQIYI to deliver a 
three-part online drama, eventually released in January 2018, with the provision that it would be 
available on Netflix later in 2018. Netflix’s initial foray with Chinese content was the reformat-
ting of iQIYI’s Qing dynasty costume drama Empresses in the Palace in 2015. The seventy-six-
episode blockbuster was condensed into six subtitled episodes each of ninety minutes. Although 
its international reception on Netflix was far from a success, it did at least show that Chinese 
content could be made available on Western platforms, with some reformatting to accommo-
date foreign viewing tastes. The fact of the matter, however, is that the core audience for such 
culturally specific costume dramas are native Chinese or at least people with deep understand-
ings of Chinese history. Most of them would have viewed the series, already subtitled in full on 
iQIYI’s existing overseas platforms, accessible by DVD, satellite, or TV-Pad subscriptions.
Alibaba’s foray into the content sector is a strategy both to compete with its domestic com-
petitors and to consolidate its brand with a younger audience. Acquiring the video site Youku 
Tudou, as well as having a controlling interest in Sina, has allowed Jack Ma, Alibaba’s execu-
tive chairman, to present himself as a champion of Chinese culture. Ma has even cast himself 
in a short movie called Gong Shou Dao (literally “the way of keeping work”) that is, according 
to Ma, intended to showcase Chinese traditional culture. The venture by Alibaba into the film 
and content sector brings Alibaba’s crowdfunding entity Yulebao64 into play while featuring 
self-promotion of its content on Youku Tudou. Alibaba’s acquisition of the Hong Kong based 
“quality” newspaper, The South China Morning Post, in 2016 has both rejuvenated the com-
pany but also positioned it as a carrier of mainland Chinese values, much to the consterna-
tion of many in Hong Kong.65 Meanwhile, Tencent’s international ambitions are largely based 
on the online games and its instant messaging site WeChat.
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Table 1. Industry Acquisitions by BAT from 2010 to 2017.
Baidu’s acquisition and investment Year Business strategy
iQIYI (China) 2010, 2012 Video streaming and UGC
PPS Net TV (China) 2013 Movies, Japanese anime, and sports programs: 
PPS is a subbrand of iQIYI
Zongheng Literature Website (China) 2013 Chinese online reading business.
Perfect World purchased subsequently Zongheng 
from Baidu in 201549
iQIYI’s deal with Paramount Pictures (US) 2015 Deal for 800 films including future productions 
and coproductions
iQIYI’s deal with Universal Pictures and 
Lionsgate (US)
2015 Exclusive rights to Universal Pictures for iQIYI 
streaming platform50; SVoD rights for Lionsgate 
titles51
20th Century Fox (US) 2016 Distribution of exclusive Fox film content in 
China, iQIYI the first online platform in China for 
20th Century Fox’s movies52
British Film Institute (UK) 2016 Handpicked independent films
Sony Pictures and iQIYI (US) 2016 Coproduction of TV series
Bundesliga (Germany) 2017 The first European football league with an official 
web presence at Baidu53
Netflix and iQIYI agreement (US) 2017 Reciprocal content deals, coproduction
Warner Brothers and iQIYI54 (US) 2017 Reciprocal content deals, coproduction 
opportunities
Alibaba’s acquisition and investment Year Business strategy
Sina Weibo (China). Alibaba acquired 18% stake 
of Sina Weibo
2013 Combine social networking and 
e-commerce55
Huayi Brothers Media Corp (China)
8.1% stake in Huayi Brothers
2014 Leveraging of crowdfunding site Yulebao (娱乐宝)
China Vision Media Group (HK) 2014 Movie and TV dramas, renamed as Alibaba 
Pictures Group Ltd.
Television Broadcasts Ltd. (HK) 2015 Transform TVB into a more 
China-focused media firm56
South China Morning Post (SCMP)(HK) 2015 Transform SCMP into a global media entity 
providing news about China57
Youku Tudou (China) 2016 Chinese video streaming, complement 
e-commerce, and internet finance transaction 
business58
Tencent’s acquisition and investment Year Business strategy
Riot Games (US) 2011 The games firm behind “League of Legends”
Activision Blizzard (US) 2012 Gaming
KakaoTalk (South Korea) 2012 Mobile App (free text messaging, stranger social 
networking, group chatting)59
Sea Ltd. (Singapore) 2013, 2015 Gaming60
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Tencent’s acquisition and investment Year Business strategy
20th Century Fox (US) 2016 Film coproduction
Investment in Hollywood studio STX (US) 2016 Film production, coproduction
Legendary Entertainment (US) 2016 Film, including coproduction
Sanook Online (Thailand) 2016 News portal, music streaming, instant messaging, 
e-commerce61
SVoD = subscription video on demand; UGC = user-generated content.
Elsewhere, the OBOR territories offer the prospect of further expansion. State-owned enter-
prises are following the government’s agenda, laying the infrastructure and establishing the 
base. The government believes that this physical infrastructure will accommodate cultural 
traffic, for instance, more Confucius Institutes, more TV channels, more cultural theme 
parks, and more museums. Already Alibaba has moved to extend its e-commerce coverage 
along the OBOR. According to its estimates, 45 percent of the users of Alipay, its online pay-
ment system, are situated in OBOR territories including India, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines.66 It has established warehouses to speed up transportation through its logistic 
system as well as having cloud infrastructure services in Singapore and Dubai. Alibaba’s 
e-commerce presence in these territories provides residents and consumers with high-
quality products. In addition to having access to the e-commerce platform, consumers may 
well become habituated to visiting digital content platforms such as Youku Tudou that 
increasingly celebrate an Asia “harmoniously” integrated with China.
The colonization of the region makes sense in many respects; it follows the national plan. 
However, populations along the OBOR, for instance, those in Central Asia and the subconti-
nent, are far more culturally diverse than the enclaves of Chinese viewers in the Asia-Pacific. 
Korean TV dramas have made deeper inroads than Chinese serials in Thailand, whereas 
Indian and Pakistan dramas are more attuned to Bollywood than Beijing. The aim of the 
OBOR strategy so far is infrastructural, finding a way to release excess industrial capacity in 
iron, steel, and concrete; building roads, bridges, and hospitals; and laying cable.
Concluding Remarks
In the introduction, we identified three key levels of cultural traffic: cultural products and 
services, ideology, and the physical movement of human capital. If we consider the first level, 
products, and services, online platforms such as Youku Tudou, iQIYI, and WeChat/Tencent 
Videos carry a modern playlist of rich Chinese content to the world. Ideology exists in these 
commercialized media products of course but far less than what one finds on China Global 
Network TV (CGTN), the official online platform. Other developments reflect latent national-
ism: it is uplifting for many Chinese nationals living outside the PRC to see fresh innovative 
forms of modern television or to watch Chinese films in Wanda’s “China-owned” cinemas. 
However, the strategy remains fundamentally ethnocentric because it aggregates Chinese-
speaking audiences. Viewers and users are predominantly resident in the Asia-Pacific.
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Chinese television, for instance, is concentrated in certain markets: the United States, 
Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.67 Programs are readily accessible on platforms, 
such as the Asian content-streaming site Viki, which is headquartered in San Francisco, or 
through digital subscription services using set-top boxes (modems). In Singapore, selected 
Chinese dramas and variety content are found on free-to-air channels such as MediaCorp 
Channel 8 and Channel U or on Toggle.sg, a freemium over-the-top (OTT) service related to 
MediaCorp. In addition, pay-TV channels from China such as Shen Zhou TV, CCTV4, Dragon 
TV, and NOW are available via subscription services bundled by Starhub or Singtel. Other 
dedicated streaming platform choices include Viu, iflix, and Netflix.
In effect, consumption of Chinese culture outside the mainland combines new and older forms 
of media and a variety of access points. State data on official sales of Chinese television pro-
grams from 2008 to 2016 clearly show the challenges of breaking into non-Asian markets. The 
Taiwanese market, where Mandarin is spoken, remains the strongest performer; more recently, 
there has been growth in Japan and South Korea. But European, African, and US markets have 
not shown growth: between 2008 and 2016, sales of TV programs (all genres) to Europe 
remained low, as was the case in US and African markets.68 Most growth occurred in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and South Korea.69 TV drama sales have constituted the bulk of the market.
South and East Asia therefore hold the most hope for China’s cultural empowerment strategy. 
The region is home to many people of Chinese origin, many of whom are likely to feel some 
sense of pride in seeing Chinese culture expand, even if they hold diverging views about 
China’s political leadership and geopolitical footprints in the region. Moreover, in regard to 
investment, collaborating with persons of Chinese heritage, the so-called hidden dragons,70 
may yet be the best way forward. In the film industries, for instance, the bulk of the develop-
ment, financial, investment, and human capital is coming from the East Asian region.71
In the introduction, we also characterized the Chinese state apparatus as a slow-moving ship, 
referencing the massive “treasure vessels” used by the famed Ming dynasty navigator Zheng 
He during his many seagoing voyages. The traffic was basically one way, although Chinese cul-
ture, customs, and artifacts did spread to new territories. The treasure ship metaphor can now 
be revised to factor in the speed of modern communications. Rather than a slow-moving ship 
laden with treasure and tributes, the state apparatus is reimagined as a mothership, that is, a 
large vehicle like an aircraft carrier or a spacecraft that transports other smaller ones. CGTN, 
for instance, is the designated mothership, following in the wake of its predecessor CCTV 
International, Xinhua News service, and the many human-centered cultural emissaries—
Confucius Institutes, performing arts troupes, delegations, and conferences.
Fast-moving commercial digital companies are “going out,” seeking virtual treasures, 
mostly for their shareholders, although they are required to “pay back” the government for 
its support. Yukon Huang, author of Cracking the China Conundrum, says that the economy 
in China is not about firms but about state–firm relations, including local and regional 
governments.72 The political scientist, David Kelly, puts a finer point on this, suggesting 
that the term “private,” as exemplified by the new breed of entrepreneurs, should be 
described as “less state.”73 Dalian Wanda’s acquisition of AMC, for example, which required 
US$3.1 billion would not have been possible without the support of state banks in China.74 
If these companies overreach, as the Wanda Group has done, they run the risk of incurring 
the wrath of the command center, the Chinese Communist Party.
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Are BAT followers or pioneers? The article began by asking, “Whose interests are they serv-
ing?” One answer, based on their market performance, is that these companies are proto-
typical capitalist entities. While each has its own core business, in an era of convergence, 
there are inevitable turf battles. Aside from iQIYI, Baidu is looking the least likely to achieve 
internationalization; Alibaba’s massive e-commerce business is augmented by its cultural 
ambitions and its investment in film production; Tencent is empowered by the ubiquity of 
the mobile internet and its strengths in gaming. Of course, the government wants to ride on the 
success of these companies because the commercial digital platforms are outperforming the 
state’s cultural power emissaries. Yet, the commercial digital companies are not defined by 
the state’s internationalizing agendas: they are aligned as far as it is necessary. As Jack Ma, 
the founder and former CEO of Alibaba, said about his relationship with government, “it’s 
okay to be in love with them, but don’t marry them.”75
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